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Abstract  
 
Consciousness and  the mind  are prescientific concepts that begin with Greek theorizing. They suppose 
human rationality and  reasoning placed  in the human head  by (in Christian terms) God, who 
structured  the universe he created  with the same kind  of underlying characteristics. Descartes‟ 
development of the model included  scientific objectivity by placing the mind  outside the physical 
universe. In its failure under evidential scrutiny and  without physical explanation,  this model is 
destined  for terminal decline. Instead , a genuine biologica l and  physical function for the brain 
phenomenon can be developed . This is the theory of brain-sign. It accepts the causality of the brain as its 
physical characteristics, already under scientific scrutiny. What is needed  is a new neurophysiological 
mapping language that specifies the relation of the structure and  operation of the brain to organismic 
action in the world . Still what is lacking is an account of how neurophysiologies in d ifferent organisms 
communicate on dynamic, i.e. unpred ictable, tasks. It is this evolved  capacity that has emerged  as 
brain-sign. Thus rather than mentality being an  inner epistemological parallel world  suddenly 
appearing in the head , brain-sign, as the neural sign of the causal status of the brain, facilitates the 
communicative medium of otherwise isolated  organisms. The biogenesis of the phenomenon emerges 
d irectly from the account of the physical brain, and  functions as a monistic feature of organisms in the 
physical world. This new parad igm offers d isciplinary compatibility, and  genuine development in 
behavioral and  brain sciences.  
 
Key words: action theory; brain-sign; consciousness; eliminativism; neural communication 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 In 2004, BBS (Behavioral and Brain Sciences) published  two particular papers consecutively for 
review (27:5). It was because of their content, I expect, that an ed itorial decision was made 
about this juxtaposition. The papers were: What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A  defense 
manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists, by Don Ross and  David  Spurrett; and  The Illusion 
of Conscious Will, by Daniel Wegner. The Ross/ Spurrett paper concerns the significance of 
conscious causation to the named sciences (though the word  mental is used  predominantly 
rather than conscious), and  the Wegner paper (a précis from his book, 2002) proposes that 
conscious will is not causal. 
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In 2011 the editors at ANS invited me to publish paper written in 2006 (in the present form slightly edited) revealing my 
developing attempts to present a finished version of the theory of brain-sign. This paper is a stage on the route. I hope the reader 
will approach it in this way, and find it interesting. 
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These papers, and  the commentaries on them, reasonably represent aspects of the current 
state of the top ic of consciousness. Thus they are a convenient starting point for thi s paper, 
though of course that is not the limit of reference. 
For, current though they may be, they are both enmeshed  in what this paper will portray 
as a fundamental biological error sustained  in Western theorizing from the Greeks onwards. 
Once the specifically physical biology of organisms is clarified , their  prescientific d iscourse 
can be seen to be mistaken. What can rep lace them is the biological ontology and  function of 
the brain phenomenon with which they have been confused . The phenomenon will be 
termed  brain-sign.  
This paper presents (in severely attenuated  form) the theory of brain -sign. With this 
theory we have a means of placing behavior and  the brain in the physical world .  
 
 
2. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE MIND  
 
Over the last fifty years, the status of consciousness in the physical universe has been keenly 
debated . The Ross/ Spurrett paper engages in this debate d irectly. The thrust of the paper 
concerns the position developed  over the years by Jaegwon Kim. As Kim says in his more 
recent book (2005), his concern has been the alternatives for consciousness: that in the 
physical universe, either it can be reduced  and  is causal, or it is epiphenomenal, in which 
case it is not causal. The d ifficulty is, if we wish to hold  onto the notion that consciousness is 
causal, how is it to be reduced? 
The Wegner paper, by contrast, is concerned  with the empirical evidence, amassed  at 
length, ind icating that, whatever we may suppose we are doing as conscious subjects, we are 
not causing anything in the physical universe by will. Thus consciousness and  causation are 
addressed  in these two papers from d ifferent approaches. 
 
 
2.1. Initial remarks 
 
In Kim‟s 2005 book, he says of consciousness: “Of course, if our scheme of concepts were 
rad ically altered , the problems would  be as well…. To motivate the d iscard ing of a concept, 
we need  independent reasons―we should  be able to show it to be deficient, or flawed  in 
some fund amental way, independently of the fact that it generates puzzles and  problems that 
we are unable to deal with” (p . 30). 
The concept or theory of consciousness has been a p roblem from its inception. Indeed , 
Kim‟s remark is curious. For one might suppose that the puzzles and  problems were guides 
to the reasons why the concept should  be d iscarded . However, Kim believes there are no 
such reasons. He continues: “It may well be that the p roblem is an inexorable consequence of 
the tension between the objective world  of physical existence and  the subjective world  of 
experience, and  that the d istinction between the objective and  subjective is unavoidable for 
reflective cognizers and  agents of the kind  that we are” (p30/ 31). It is apparent that Kim 
simply assumes the subjective/ objective nature of consciousness without considering 
whether this very d ivision  is not a reason for d iscard ing the concept. After all, since Kim 
accepts the physical universe as what is, one might question whether there is subjectivity in 
the physical universe. And  since it is consciousness that generates the objective for us 
(supposed ly), one might wonder whether we really d o „have access to‟ the objective.  
(This is not the ap proach to Kim that Ross/ Spurrett ad opt. The main thrust of their attack 
on Kim‟s position is his supposition that fundamental physicality, as is now conceived  by 
physicists, involves the notion of causality at all.) 
Discard ing conscious will, as Wegner proposes, is actually a step in d iscard ing 
consciousness, though Wegner appears not to appreciate this. (I.e. the consciousness model is 
fatally broken.) In his response to the commentary on his paper, he states why there is such 
strong reaction, in some quarters, to his proposal that conscious will is illusory. It is because 
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our own experience is being controverted . “The experience of conscious will is, of course, the 
basis of the intuition we all have that we cause our actions” (p . 681). However, what is 
remarkable is that Wegner makes a causal d istinction between this experience, this feeling, 
and  thought. He says that “Thoughts must cause action… This is the empirical will as defined  
in ICW . It is only when we add  the experience of conscious will to the system that everything 
becomes murky. Heyman [a commentator] reports that ICW  overlooks „the objective basis for 
the sensation.‟ It does so because the book simply assumes intelligent goal-seeking behavior 
on the part of humans. The experience of such behavio r is the issue” (ibid ., original 
emphasis). 
In this excerpt Wegner does not explain our experience of conscious will in any 
ontological sense. Nor does he tell us how thought is reducible to physicality (as Kim would  
require) that it may be causal. Nor does he tell us why intelligent goal-seeking behavior, 
which is presumably associated  with thought, should  be objective. What does objective entail 
here, and  specifically as thought? He d oes tell us that “The feeling of doing establishes a 
„doer,‟ not only au thenticating the self but constructing the self from what was previously 
thin air” (p680/ 681). But he does not tell us how a feeling  establishes a d oer (what d oes this 
mean?), or what authenticating entails (what authenticates what and  to whom and  by what 
means?), or what constructing a self from thin air could  possibly entail in any scientific or 
ontological sense. And  what has all this to do with a brain, the apparent source of all this 
mysterious happening? 
When the commentators Bogen and  Raz & Norman complain that Wegner‟s piece lacks 
neuroscience, Wegner pleads that he is writing as a social cognitive psychologist. But his 
consoling reference to imaging stud ies (“exciting new ventures”, e.g. Ito‟s cerebellum -
mediated  internal feedback, p . 686) is highly speculative, since neuropsychology conducted  
by current fMRI imaging has no identified method by which correlations can be made between 
what a subject experiences and  what is illuminated . I.e. if there is to be a d ivision between 
physical causes (Wegner often calls these unconscious causes) and  experiencing as Wegner 
claims (as indeed  may be the case, but the latter must be still physical), then what is 
illuminated  in the image cannot be assigned  de facto to experiencing, but will likely be what is 
actually causal. After all, experiencing (so-called) is pervasive, and  why should  we not 
suppose that experiencing be d ifferentiated  from causal processes  in the brain image, or more 
rad ically, experience of e.g. thought be not differentiated  from other experiencing? Moreover, 
if what must be d ifferentially apparent  are the action-related  physical causes in the brain, are 
they in fact thought? [This is a d irect challenge to this kind  of statement by Stent (2005). 
“Probably the most promising…method  of advancing our understand ing of the biological 
basis of our thoughts and  feelings is brain imaging, which permits the observation of…the 
very parts of the living brain that are involved  in the generation of mental phenomena” 
(p146), reconstructed  from original text.] 
There is ind icative evidence for the d ivision here. In the imaging referred  to by Neville et 
al. (1998), „speech‟ areas of the brain are illuminated  by hearing subjects read ing, but also 
illuminated  by deaf people watching American Sign Language (ASL), viz. the Broca and  
Wernicke areas in the left hemisphere. In add ition, however, the superior temporal gyrus on 
the right hemisphere is active in response to ASL in deaf subjects, an area that would  be 
activated  in hearing subjects listening to language. We mig ht conclude that the left 
hemisphere illumination d oes not necessarily involve experience, since it is d ifferent for each, 
but causal language processing which is common. We might also conclude that for hearing 
watchers, what would be causing the illumination in the right hemisphere of hearers hearing 
is not the experience (since there is none), but causal function replicated by ASL watchers who 
cannot hear. For hearing subjects competent in ASL also have the area illuminated  when 
watching ASL. Further exam ples are in the footnote.
1
 
                                                 
1 (1) Physical damage can occur without a subject feeling pain, i.e. even though signaling is taking place to, and in, the brain 
from the damaged areas; and pain can occur without there being any physical damage. See e.g. Wall 1999 for extensive 
discussion. His conclusion: “The classical theory is that the brain analyses the sensory input to determine what has happened and 
presents the answer as pure sensation. I propose an alternative theory: that the brain analyses the input in terms of what action 
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Already we find  no science in view, for there is no domain of d iscourse in which the 
ground  rules, and  identifiable lawful components, are commonly scientifically accepted  (cf. 
Kuhn‟s notion of “normal science”, 1962). Indeed , no  agreed  explanation exists for how 
consciousness is to be reduced  (cf. Kim 2003, p . 152), or more fundamentally, what 
consciousness is in any scientific sense (e.g. Seager 1999; Pap ineau 2003).
2
 
 
 
2.2. Analysis 
 
The Ross/ Spurrett paper is concerned  to preserve key features of cognitive science, 
understood  as functionalism. They regard  Kim‟s reductionist proposal for functionalism as 
destructive of the very notion of functionalism. They say: “By functionalism we understand  
any position that assigns serious ontological status to types or states of processes 
ind ividuated  by reference to what they do rather than what they are made of―that is by 
reference to their effects, rather than (necessarily) their constituents” (p . 604). The assumption 
is that mental states are functional states. Such a state could  be a thought, as Wegner has it. In 
the camp of some theoreticians, it may be d istingu ished  from a feeling, as of conscious will, 
which is causally problematic because of its subjectivity. With some theoreticians the 
problem of subjective states certainly applies to qualia (e.g. Block 1995; Chalmers 1996). 
Ross/ Spurrett intend  to p reserve causal ascription to mental states, and  presumably they 
would  class a feeling as functional and  causal too: they deplore Chalmer s‟ conservative 
metaphysics that results in dualism, they say. 
But without taking biology into account, is functionalism a valid  approach, not merely in 
terms of biology‟s capacity to realize mental states as causal physicality, but in endorsing the 
concept of mentality at all? Or, co-opting David  Martel Johnson‟s words, “Compared  with 
structuralist and  behaviorist investigators they claim to have refuted , present -day cognitivists 
are not in as good  a position to propose and  defend  any single, precise conce pt of what the 
mind is” (2005, p . 5). Surely without a precise and  biological concept of the mind , pursuing a 
scientific theme is futile. Is it not reasonable to say that cognitive science (as Ross/ Spurrett 
conceive it), with its mentalist assumptions, is batting on the wrong wicket; that the 
revolution Chomsky was a major player in initiating, from behaviorism back to mentalism, 
was the wrong move?
3
 I am going to raise three fund amental objections to mental states.  
 
 
2.2.1. The cultural/historical derivation 
 
It might seem hard ly necessary to point out that the notion of mental states does not derive 
from a scientific view of the universe. That we live with a cultural assumption about the 
mind  is surely widely und erstood . But current d iscourse ind icates th at its significance is not 
understood  at all. 
                                                                                                                                           
would be appropriate” (p176). (2) For discussion of anomalies where brain activation in the ventral stream processing areas may 
or may not generate visual experience, see e.g. Dehaene & Naccache, 2001, and discussion of their paper (and others) by Block 
in the same volume. But the conclusion we draw is not that experiencing requires an additional neural X; nor is there a multiple 
conscious possibility―phenomenality, access or reflexivity―as does Block. Rather there are two different neural functions, as 
discussed subsequently. (3) The claim by Andy Clark and Jesse Prinz (2004, p67) that the recently well-publicized capacity of a 
paralyzed patient to move a cursor about on a screen is by thought (a supposition widely assumed in the press), as a result of 
electrodes inserted in the brain, is quite unfounded. As we shall propose, what causes the move of the cursor are the physical 
brain states at which the electrodes are directed, and the sense of thought is a resulting reporting of the brain status, but not to a 
causal mental subject.  
2 It is fairly common practice not even to specify what is meant by consciousness, but to proceed as if it is an adequately 
accepted scientific fact. This is true of the Churchlands (PM 1995, PS 2002), and Christoph Koch (2004). J Graham Beaumont 
(1999) states more appositely: “Neuropsychology is in a conceptual morass. Neuropsychologists seek to study the relation 
between brain and mind, but without really addressing the status of these two constructs, or what potential form the relation 
between them might take” (p527).     
3A key document referred to is Chomsky‟s (1959) review of B.F. Skinner‟s Verbal Behavior. Skinner‟s behaviorism was tied to 
too limited a set of underlying notions. Language is discussed here at 3.2.4. 
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To be extremely synoptic: The mind  begins with the Greeks. The theory is that placed  in 
the human head  is a correspondence to what lies behind  the physical world , nous 
(intelligence, reason, etc.) corresponding to the universe‟s Nous, and  logos ([logical] 
thought/ speech) corresponding to the universe‟s Logos. In the Christian version, God , being 
the creator of the universe, naturally „thought‟ the essence of things, and  this kind of capacity 
was placed  by him within, or as, the human mind . (Further below 2.2.3, & note 6.) With 
Descartes, the idea is developed , based  upon the medieval integration of the Greek ideas 
with the Christian soul. Now the intellect, and sensation and  feeling, are properties of the 
human mind . Its capacities are endorsed  specifically by God. Thus Descartes can claim both 
objectivity (for science), because what he thinks is underpinned  by God who has made 
everything and  therefore knows it, and  proper ontology, because the mind  is not part of the 
physical universe bu t in a spiritual realm roughly equivalent to God, which is how thought 
(ideas) can be objective and  certain. Egoism (my soul) becomes (problematically) a theme of 
Western philosophy/ psychology. 
Now Ross/ Spurrett and  Wegner, and  Kim too, may suppose we „naturally‟ think the way 
we do about the mind . But „naturally‟ here cannot mean „unalloyed  by the Greek/ Christian 
trad ition‟. We may pay lip  service to the notion that the mind  must be physical, but we re tain 
in large part precisely the Greek/ Christian trad ition (includ ing materialists like, yes, Dennett 
(1991a; 1996) and  the Churchlands (PM 1995; PS 2002)).  
In Kim‟s approach there is a mind  and  it is problematically related  to the physical world , 
and  there are only two op tions concerning it: Either it is reducible  or epiphenomenal. But this 
very specification of the mind  may be seen as a false d ichotomy via the Greek/ Christian 
trad ition. For nothing in that trad ition bears any relation to the physical universe. I.e., 
although subsequent to Descartes there has been d issolution of aspects of his theory, in 
principle it remains as it always was―about another kind of existent. 
After all, what causes us to think as we d o about the mind  (trad itional or not) must itself 
be a physical process, and  to suppose we have an option about what we think ―that we (the 
mind) have some freedom in this by contrast w ith states of the physical universe (a Kantian 
(1781, 1789) d istinction solid ly within the trad ition)―is already to deny the characteristics of 
the physical universe. Part of coming to grips with the physical universe as what is involves 
appreciating what „being a trad ition‟ entails, and  what any theory can be for us as physical 
organisms. 
The point here is that, because of our cultural attachment to consciousness and  the mind , 
a biological analysis of the neurophysiological phenomenon within the terms o f the physical 
universe is actually obfuscated . 
 
 
2.2.2. The predicament  
 
Both Kim and  Wegner assume that we have self-knowledge. In Kim‟s terms we are 
“reflective cognizers”, and  in Wegner‟s terms we experience (i.e. we are knowingly aware of) 
our conscious will. Thus there is a state of consciousness and  there is a state of consciousness 
of it. This is Descartes‟ model in that the mind‟s subject can  interrogate (reflectively) its 
content, where the content precedes (structurally) the ensuing interrogatio n. 
Since Dennett uses the term „mind‟, we should  present his materialist position of „mental 
content‟. Dennett (1991a, 1991b) proposes the brain represents (a “real pattern”), and  it (i.e. 
not a self) is a judgment that can be causal as a representation (or, again, a d iscrimination). By 
eliminating the conscious self (ontologically) in this way, Dennett intends to remove the 
problematic aspects of subjectivity (includ ing an infinite regress of homunculus explanation), 
and  coincidentally the possibility of p henomenology, i.e. the privileged  interior availability of 
content to the self, the Cartesian Theater as he has styled  it.
4
 
                                                 
4The problems with Dennett‟s position are widely commented. To quote a passage with familiar elements. “Mental contents 
become conscious not by entering some special chamber in the brain, not by being transduced into some privileged and 
mysterious medium, but by winning the competitions against other mental contents for domination in the control of behavior, 
  
 
 
Activitas Nervosa Superior 2011, 53, No. 3-4 
 
 
106 
 
But the question is not whether prima facie these accounts could  be understood  as 
physically realizable, but whether the (mentalist) words knowledge or judgment used  in the 
accounts apply to (physical) biological organisms. And more precisely: To the biological 
organismic phenomenon that is me. What is pointed  to here is the predicament we face in 
being this phenomenon in the physical world . 
Here is a specific example of the pred icament. I stand  before a tree. I see the tree. What I 
see, however, is not what is there. I am in a mental state which has the tree as its perceptual 
content. The perceptual state, which I call seeing the tree, is actually an artifact of my brain. I 
have no way of escaping my position to verify either that the tree I see is what is there, or that 
I see it. More precisely, the state of experiencing (so-called) which I am is also the state of 
appearing which is of both the tree and  myself; and  the latter is as the experiencer of the tree 
and  of myself (reflectively). In other words, although it might seem that I react to the tree 
because I see it, and  I react to it as such, in my pred icament I cannot escape to the realm of 
knowledge or judgment (that Kim et al. or Dennett claim) because I cannot exit my condition 
as which I am (so-called) experience and  appearance. Indeed , the very claim that my mental 
state is causal, either as a knowledge capacity of perception, or a jud gment of my brain, 
depends for its p lausibility upon a condition to which I cannot aspire. For me (the 
phenomenon), there is no independent level for my causal claim. 
This is not a hopeless situation. It is not hopeless (in this sense) because clear ly we go on: 
we exist now and  we will tomorrow. Things work (as they do for apes, d ogs, fish, worms, 
amoeba, etc.). However, there is an analogy to be found  in our pred icament with the 
Copernican revolution. Placed  as we were upon the earth, we could  not see (perceptually) 
that the earth goes round  the sun. But by scientific enquiry, we could  find  evidence for it. Our 
pred icament here (more fundamentally) is as experiencers-appearers. What we need  is a 
theory which deals with the pred icament as the brain has engineered it, one for which there is 
evidence. 
What we cannot do by contrast (but is the Greek/ Christian trad ition), is presuppose that 
our experiencing-appearing gives us the concepts of the mental, includ ing its causality, 
because we cannot take for granted , biologically, that anything can be presupposed  about 
what the phenomenon is. After all, science informs us that the colors we see do not exist in 
the world ; that the universe is not three d imensional as it appears; that the solid  objects we 
see are actually regions of space populated  by highly active microstructural units; and  so on. 
Indeed , as Wegner‟s book illustrates, and  Freud  proposed  a hundred  years ago, it is often the 
case that there is no correlation between our experience-appearance (includ ing thought!) and  
what we do. We cannot just refine our notion of mental states  (e.g. d ivide them into the 
conscious and  non-conscious). We must find  a biological theory that clarifies the 
phenomenon fund amentally. And  that is problematic, for the phenomenon cannot provide us 
with its self-interpretation: the pred icament ind icates that we cannot assume an us, the 
egoistic (mental) knower or (physical!) judger, to whom it could  d o so. To repeat, the 
Greek/ Christian trad ition is not founded  on the principles  of a physical universe. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
and hence for achieving long-lasting effects―or as we misleadingly say, „entering into memory.‟ And since we are talkers, and 
since talking to ourselves is one of our most influential activities, one of the most effective ways for a mental content to become 
influential is for it to get into the position to drive the language-using parts of the controls” (1996, pp205/206). 1) How does the 
brain („mere‟ physical states) create (synthesize?) „mental content‟? 2) How do (Oliver Selfridge‟s) mental contents compete 
with each other and win: i.e. by what physical process as content? [3) Dennett‟s notion of „celebrity‟ for mental content is 
consciousness defining itself in its own terms, not explaining itself by an ontologically more fundamental process.] 4) How does 
content enter into memory, even if we misleadingly so specify it? 5) How do we talk to ourselves? Who is doing what to whom? 
(We understood there was no self.) 6) How is behavior controlled by mental content: i.e. once having become content (e.g. a 
belief), how does this (as yet unexplained) physicality as intentional exercise physical control of motor actions? 7) What does 
“drive the language using parts of the controls” entail in any physically expressible sense? And so on.  
The imprecision in Dennett‟s presentation, by which he claims to be talking of physicality yet slides seamlessly into mentalist 
and personal terms, gives the lie to the fact that he has any physical theory (a point made by e.g. Seager 1999), but is rather 
strenuously trying to subvert Cartesian materialism amongst his contemporaries. Interestingly, in his comments (2004), he 
criticizes Wegner for precisely the same ontological imprecision. 
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2.2.3. The physical universe 
 
Now we note what the pred icament seems to imply. Is all enquiry hopeless because we 
cannot place the function of consciousness, the function upon which we supposed ly rely to 
found  our knowled ge, and  which in our everyday activity we rely upon to act? No, we 
stated , because things appear to go on working, includ ing some of our theories. But it seems 
very d ifficult to suppose the theories we have about the universe that seem to work do not 
rely upon the fact that we seem to have them: e.g. the theory of special relativity of which I 
am now thinking. Even if we have no convincing exp lanation of how the brain can generate, 
or be, this thought, how can we deny this thought exists? I am having it now! 
What the pred icament example demonstrates, however, is that the conviction of our 
having this thought (or seeing this tree) is itself placed  within a biological actuality to which 
the conviction (the state of being convinced  or certain) cannot  access. The pred icament might 
be held  to lead  to Cartesian d oubt or Humean skepticism, but it is neither of those. It is 
alread y a construct in a biological theory of the brain in a purely physical world ; a theoretical 
position which subverts the claim that consciousness mu st be self-revealing of itself, the 
world  and  ourselves, and  other attributes like its causality. The theory ind icates that Kim‟s 
found ational point about consciousness, i.e. objectivity vs. subjectivity, is not presupposable, 
since Kim would  first have to have a biological theory of the phenomenon to make such a 
claim, if he really acknowledges the physical universe is what is.  
The physical universe, as science conceives it, exists as the properties of mass/ energy 
space-time. It constantly changes as its cond itions change. It is at each instant. A feature of 
the physical universe is biological organisms. They, too, are at each instant. They evolve in 
the manner of natural selection; they survive by their fitness in the environment, and  their 
ability to reproduce. The function of organisms, if one can ascribe function to them, is to 
survive and  reproduce. Their adaptational capability is a factor in their survival. A factor in 
their ad aptational capability is their memory, rendering behavior modification acco rd ing to 
previous interaction with the environment. Memory, as initially identified  by Donald  Hebb 
(1949) (i.e. before he turned  it into neuropsychology), means neural modification. Behavior, 
or action, is what enables survival by the organism. Behavior is  not only modified  interaction 
with the environment; it is also learned  by interaction with parents and  others. Learning is 
the modification of neural structure, and  the recent id entification of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti 
et al. 1996) has given support to this notion. 
Nowhere in this extremely synoptic version of organismic biology as physicality is there a 
place for a causal psyche, or psychology―percep tions, thoughts, feelings, sensations, 
beliefs/ desires, etc. The problem for us in grasp ing the actuality  of the physical universe 
(apparently, but this is the Greek/ Christian supposition) is that we (as the phenomenon) 
seem to inhabit a d ifferent state from it. But there are two analogies that may help us move 
beyond  this: the first, already mentioned , Copernicus vs. the Aristotelian/ Ptolemaic 
universe; the second , Darwin‟s evolutionary theory which d iscounted  any privilege to 
humans in their biological emergence. 
We must add  to our pred icament as the brain phenomenon, as so far d iscussed . For not 
only can we not justify our theories by (the mentalist properties of) knowledge or judgment 
because of the nature of our pred icament; in fact we cannot suppose any causal property 
exists for the organism from the phenomenon for precisely the same reason. As the 
phenomenon, I am in being at each instant, like everything else in the physical universe. 
Nothing I am as the phenomenon causes my next appearance and  the appearance of the 
world  as me as the phenomenon. I d o not cause my appearance as the phenomenon when 
born, and  I d o not cause its d issolution when I d ie, and  I cause nothing in between. What 
causes my appearance is the physicality which it is, and  to argue that the phenomenon is a 
physicality (called  the mental) and  thus is causal is already to separate it out from physicality 
to identify its causality, which is quite absurd  if one accepts that the phenomenon is physical.  
If there is causality for the organism as physicality, it lies in the properties of mass/ energy 
space-time; and  whilst there may be properties of consciousness which cannot be accounted  
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as causal physicality for the organism, that does mean the brain phenomenon is not physical, 
because its properties cou ld  entail causality in another way.
5
 In that way of being, the 
phenomenon can be entirely reducible as (i.e. not to) physicality as Kim requires, but still not 
be causal for the organism and not epiphenomenal. 
This argument should  be quite acceptable to Kim, because he begins his account from this 
position: the d istinction between vertical and  horizontal causality, from his mentor Jonathan 
Edwards (Kim 2005, p . 36-38). The problem is, Kim d oes not think in terms of biology, but 
entirely within the Greek/ Christian trad ition, and  that is a hopeless framework for 
interpreting the organism in the physical universe. What we need  here, to remove the 
impasse, and  identify how we can genuinely arrive at a science (and  understand  what a 
science can be for us as physical organisms, and  what the word  „understand‟ entails, & etc.), 
is a Kuhnian (1962) change of parad igm. 
 
 
2.3. Summary 
 
It is not, as Wegner says, that our experience of the will makes us think it causal. The 
metaphor for consciousness, stretching back at least to the Greeks, is being in the light.
6
 We (as 
organisms) are illuminated  in the world  lit up for us as consciousness. The impetus for 
mentalism is the notion that, being in the light, our rational actions (thought rather than 
feeling) result, for everything is available to the (causal) rationality that consciousness 
confers: hence the use of the term access, by e.g. Block 1995 or global accessibility 2001, and  
d istinguished  from the egoismic phenomenal.
7
 Hence, indeed , cognitive science. As old  as the 
Greeks, and  still not comprehensible. For light is not an intrinsic property of electromagn etic 
rad iation: it is just (brain-made) what we see (so far undefined), or facilitates our seeing; it 
confers no access as knowledge (where knowledge is taken as: representation of what is to a 
subject). 
Our analysis offers a d ifferent interpretation. If the phenomenon is physical, and  not 
merely supervenient upon the physical, then its causality results from its being physical. But 
it is not, as Davidson (1970) attempted  to compromise, that mental events cause physical 
events in a law -like manner only under physical description. Being physical, the 
phenomenon itself (as a state) must be describable as physicality (i.e. what is a physical 
thought, a physical feeling? and  why are they not necessarily causal?). Therefore if the 
phenomenon has causal implications, its nature as physicality must be revealed , not fudged  
as some unanalysable (i.e. hermetically self-defining) supervenient feature.
8
 It will not be 
causal for the organism because its function is not mass/ energy space-time, though its 
existence is. And  because of this, we do not conclude that no causality is involved  in its 
function. To clarify this requires explicating the biology.
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5This is not intended to preclude causality in the organism which does not include the brain. 
6An obvious reference is to the Cave Parable in Plato‟s Republic. But that is preceded by (not least) the Presocratic fragment 64 
in the Diels-Kranz numeration of Heraclitus, translated as “Thunderbolt steers all things” (Kirk et al. 1983, p197/198); or as 
Heidegger (1975, p72) interprets it: “But lightning steers (in presencing) the totality (of what is present)”. For discussion on the 
relation to Zeus and earlier notions of the divine sun, see Kirk et al. (pp198-200). 
7 The notion that content is accessible, i.e. causal, while phenomenal states, or qualia, are not depends upon an a priori definition 
of mentality, rather than what it could be physically. But since there is no explanation offered of what mentality is causally as 
physicality (or not), the distinction lacks physical plausibility (cf. note 20). 
8The widespread notion that mental states are propositional attitudes offers no explanation, biologically, of what they are. As 
Dennett (1994) says: “The most sweeping conclusion I have drawn on the theory of content is that the large and well-regarded 
literature on propositional attitudes…is a disciplinary artefact of no long term importance whatever, except as history‟s most 
slowly unwinding unintended reductio ad absurdum”( p241). 
9 There is no analogy here with Dennett‟s (1991b) use of abstracta for beliefs. 
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3. THE THEORY OF BRAIN-SIGN 
 
What characterizes a Kuhnian-type revolution is a reassessment of the fund amentals. The 
theory of consciousness specifies two kind s of causality for the brain: the realm of physicality 
which is neurophysiology (often ambiguously termed  unconscious), and  another realm 
which is the properties of consciousness. Instead  we propose one realm of causality for the 
brain, electro/ chemical neurophysiology. But there is another physical function. And  that 
involves a physical feature: the brain phenomenon we are pursuing. Its causality is to be 
understood  in a d ifferent way, a way revealed  by explicatin g the biology. 
The first point reinforces a previous one. There is nothing voluntary about our so -called  
experiencing. When I open my eyes, I cannot choose what to see. My seeing is a given. There 
is a supposition amongst some that I can choose what I thin k. But there is no means by which 
I can choose what I think: each appearance of a thought is a given; there is no step at which I 
can insert an independent choice. (What could  that mean?) The sense of choice (as Wegner‟s 
feeling of conscious will) is itself a given (i.e. part of the biology, as conviction above, 2.2.3). 
Nor can I choose what I d o. Although it might appear that I consider options, and  amongst 
those options make a choice, the sequence of the consideration or choosing is not something 
during which I can insert an independent evaluation, or alter what happens.
10
 
Of course, freedom as sp irit, soul or mind  was a key feature of consciousness. The 
retention of this prescientific notion exists in Dennett‟s materialism. In fact, Dennett is a 
materialist d ualist, since his account retains the ghost of freedom beyond  physicality. But if 
consciousness is physical, it is wholly determined , and  thus the mentalist word  experience 
(which he uses constantly) is fallacious (as we shall see), since that would  imp ly a (dualist) 
self capable of independent (i.e. free) activity as a result of being an experiencer in its inner 
(Cartesian?) realm. 
While there is a brain parad igm that is consciousness, the organism does not relate 
physically to the world , bu t to a simulacrum of the world , now not end owed by God, but by 
the brain‟s own manufacture―under some obscure (i.e. without physical explanation) 
principle. We d o not thereby grasp the physical organism per se, nor its mod us operandi 
under evolu tionary princip les.
11
 A Kuhnian-type revolu tion will not be towards an arcane or 
strange alternative to the prevailing view (which itself is arcaneandstrange). It will restore the 
terms of science: physicality and  physical explanation, and  the theory of evolu tion.  
 
 
3.1. An action theory of the brain  
 
A biological theory grants the brain the capacity to cause action for the organism in its 
encounter with the physical world . Brain science, therefore, must exp lore how the brain 
achieves this in its physical structure and  operation. It is not that, currently, neurobiologists 
and  neuroscientists do not engage this task. It is that their work is hampered  by the attempt 
to determine psychology in the brain, as if that were a causal mechanism to be accounted  for 
(cf. 2.1, & notes 2&11). Ross/ Spurrett, for example, suggest that consciousness results from 
the effects of dynamic systems theory. But whether that theory, or connectionism, or a 
combination of these and  many other kind s of physical causality are relevant to the brain‟s 
activity, none of them either explain consciousness, or contribute to find ing psychology in the 
brain; or, more fund amentally, justify the notion of consciousness in the first p lace (cf. Seager 
on Dennett, note 4). 
                                                 
10The topic here relates to the notion of free will. Books continue to be written, including one edited by Gary Watson in 2003. 
However, his earlier statement (1995) could not be more apposite, or more indicative of why this is a non-topic. “While 
subsequent developments have sharpened and focused the issues, the basic questions remain what they were in the seventeenth 
century” (p181). Exactly. 
11 In their widely read student text, Bear et al. (2006) state: “Exactly how the parallel stream of sensory data are melded into 
perception, images and ideas remains the Holy Grail of neuroscience” (p421). The use of the expression “Holy Grail” 
(unintentional though its irony is) exemplifies the prescientific ground that is being taught to our young people. 
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The brain adap ts to the world  it encounters for the function of survival and  reproduction. 
In so d oing, it bu ilds action programs to control the organism, which are end lessly repeated 
(cf. e.g. Edelman & Tononi 2000).
12
 Build ing action programs is by various methods: innate 
capacities, trial and  error, feedback, mimicking of parents, etc. Pursuing this is a valid  
procedure for brain science.  
What is required  is a new neurophysiological language that maps brain structu re and  
operation to the actions of the organism in the fulfillment of its biological function. This w ill 
not be in the intentional language of psychology. It will likely be a description of nested  and  
overlapping structures and  states w ithin, below, above and  apart from the ind ividual neuron 
level. In d ivesting action of intentional categories, there also needs be a significantly 
enhanced  description of categories of action in the world . 
This new neurophysiological language does not depend  upon an assumptio n of our own 
consciousness in its expression. Indeed , whatever allows us to render this non -intentional 
description of brain causality is other than consciousness. Now we want to know how that is 
achieved . So we turn to…   
 
 
3.2. The rationale for brain-sign 
 
Without moving from the physicality of dynamic systems theory, or connectionism, etc. as 
possible expositions of causality, we find  the neurophysiology of the brain facing a 
fundamental problem. It is not that it is embedded  in the world  of its action,  and  therefore 
requires some symbolic means of processing its information independent from the embedding 
(why would  it need  that?).
13
 Nor does it need  to (or could) create a workspace of mental 
properties that somehow interact and  are available (globally!) to purely physical properties. 
(Descartes‟ unsolved  interactionist problem 350+ years on.) No, the brain problem is as 
follows. Or rather, it is not a brain problem. What we shall describe is a feature from the 
evolutionary process. 
 
 
3.2.1. Brain-to-brain communication 
 
If we accept the brain has an action causing relation to the world  for the organism, then we 
need  no luminous causal inner state of correspondence to the outer physical world . But, then, 
how do our separate neurophysiologies communicate? How can purely physical states of the 
brain enter into collective activity? The elimination of the implausible, consciousness, seems 
to land  us with the impossible. 
                                                 
12E.g. “In a…detailed model of cortical areas, which included interconnected thalamic regions, we…examined the dynamics of 
reentrant interactions within the thalamocortical system…That such a self-perpetuating dynamic process, characterised by the 
strength and speed of reentrant neural interactions, can originate from the connectivity of the thalamocortical system is of 
considerable significance for understanding the actual neural events that underlie the unity of consciousness” pp119-120. 
Edelman‟s notion of the re-entrancy of neural structure in being causal is the analogy for “building programs” that we are 
making. But Edelman‟s “unity of consciousness”, a notion derived from Kant‟s transcendental unity of apperception, and by 
contrast with his (Edelman‟s) notion of neural integration (also termed binding), is causally superfluous. What remains at issue, 
however, is how and where the phenomenon is integrated for the function it performs, as discussed. 
13Kim Sterelny‟s (2003) interesting book, with much empirical reference, on what he calls decoupled representations, or belief-
like capacities, suffers from two problems in the context of the present paper. Since he scarcely mentions the word consciousness 
(with its associated ontological difficulties), we must suppose that, in using expressions like perception and sensation, or when 
he refers to mental operations as belief or desire, he means conscious manifestations, and not purely physical-neural 
implementations. But then he does not clarify why we should use the word belief (or mental) for structures that have not been 
shown to be causal-physical by any adequate theory. Moreover, causally, so-called beliefs/desires as so-called consciousness are 
not inevitably deterministic in operation, i.e. we do not necessarily act on our beliefs and desires. On the other hand, and more 
profoundly, if there are mechanisms that entail an organism not necessarily reacting directly to a stimulus but delaying, or as he 
says, having a more general usage across different kind of behavior (decoupled), why should we suppose that physicality is 
implementing (e.g.) a belief? For neurophysiology may cause behavior (perhaps on a large scale of neural structure/operation) 
which has nothing to do with an architecture of beliefs and desires, which wholly derive from what consciousness is deemed to 
give/be. As we say elsewhere, the notion of mental states is then fatally obfuscatory to the understanding of what the 
neurophysiology is actually doing. Both these problems apply to the whole literature of folk psychology. 
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 From an evolutionary point of view, this will be understood  d ifferently. Clearly (to us) 
the solipsistic organism is a poor organism, in that its means of environmental ad aptation are 
severely limited . Collective action renders far richer capabilities since actions can be shared  
and  thus be more complex so, by chance and  selection, allowing species to be more fit in the 
environment. 
What d oes this imply? Not that collective action is the cooperation of conscious 
ind ividuals, but rather results from what we describe as a collective organism, or super -
organism. From our conclusion that the action of ind ividual organisms results from 
neurophysiological programs, we then suppose that collective action resu lts from supra -
organismic neurophysiological programs. In which case the interaction, the cooperation, of 
ind ividual organisms is genetically endowed  and  learned  at an ind ividual and supra-
neurophysiological level. (Here is a crucial function for mirror neurons.) 
Still, the situation is more complex than these statements imply because the nature of the 
tasks the super-organism can implement must be con sidered . They will be d ivid ed  into two 
classes. These are categorized  by what used  to be termed  closed  and  open instincts, but are 
now more customarily termed  stereotypical and  modifiable behavioral patterns. The closed  
or stereotypical category ind icates an inherited  genetic behavioral activity which is resistant 
to change under environment-exposure influence, whereas the open or modifiable category 
ind icates that there is an intrinsic capability of modification. 
We emphasize that we are not referring to the behavioral pattern of the ind ivid ual, but the 
communication mechanism between ind ividuals. Clearly this is a severe constraint upon the 
ind ividual since, for communication to work, the cooperation of a population of ind ividuals 
is requ ired  under some stability, whereas an ind ivid ual‟s modifiability (or adaptability) in its 
own actions concerns only itself. 
 
 
3.2.2 Two classes of communication 
 
Taking this point as analytically crucial, what we propose is that, whereas there are insect 
groups which are socially complex (e.g. bees, ants, termites), their interactions are not 
dynamic. This is because the effects of their social activities can be achieved  from 
stereotyp ical behavioral communications. On the other hand  other species can cooperate in 
tasks where the behavior of the interaction is not by nature stereotypical. Thus although what 
is achieved  as a society may even seem less impressive, the capacity for interaction requires a 
fundamentally d ifferent modality. 
The contrast to be d rawn is between bees and  hunting lions. This will be used  as a 
parad igm example. In both cases the causal properties of the action taken, both ind ividually 
and  cooperatively, lie with the neurophysiology of the organisms‟ brains. In the case of the 
bee dance, the signing bee‟s brain causes it to perform the appropriate movements, even in 
the darkness of the hive, which will modify the receiving bee‟s neurophysiology such that it 
will set off in pursuit of the nectar. The stereotypical communication is the means of this 
behavior modification, although the actual signing will vary depending upon what d irections 
are being conveyed . The bee‟s search may involve d ifferent kinds of cues, includ ing the 
position of the sun and  landscape ind icators. But we do not suppose anything more th an 
neurophysiological reaction to the physical cues are necessary, obtained  by sensory input. 
There is no evidence (e.g.) that bees have mental maps of the landscape (cf. Sterelny‟s 
literature d iscussion, 2003). Nor do we suppose that bees think about what  they are doing. 
 
 
3.2.3 The brain-sign requirement 
 
The question arises, therefore, whether more unpred ictable communication requires (mental) 
perception or thought or feeling. We consider this in relation to lions who can hunt 
cooperatively. What d istinguishes the communication situation with lions from that of bees is 
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that, in the cooperative act of lions, there is an essential uncertainty or imprecision during the 
hunt. For, since each lion takes account of the movements of the prey (zebra or gazelle, e tc.), 
and  the other lions‟ movements, and  the terrain upon which the hunt takes place, there 
cannot be, in the same way as with bees, a stereotypical communicative mechanism. It 
remains the case that the neurophysiology is doing the causal work for the ind ividual lion 
with sensory input, and  this is to be seen as in the nature of a super -organism. And if the 
super-organism were genuinely that, then the hunt p rocess could  be completely conducted  
by the neurophysiology of the super-organism. But there is an absolute d ivide between the 
nodes of the super-organism, i.e. the physical d istance between each ind ividual lion‟s brain. 
Therefore a new factor is introduced . 
There is a requirement, or more precisely, an evolved  capacity for neural signification to 
take p lace between these nodes (i.e. in the brain of each lion) that, as it were, closes the loop  
of the causal process (in principle). The signification is of the continually changing causal 
neural status of each lion‟s brain. For lion A, the view of the world  it receives d uring the hunt 
process is the sensory input of the zebra on the terrain and  the other lions (B and  C). Whilst 
lion A‟s neurophysiology controls what it does as an organism in response, it also causes a 
sign in its brain of the „view‟ to which it is responding. By this means, all the lions‟ 
neurophysiologies are linked  both causally and  signifyingly in the process of the hunt. 
Moreover, we may suppose that lion A‟s brain also has an internal (as opposed  to external) 
element, the response to physical activation in relation to the hunt, which may be coded  as 
part of the neural sign along with the scene, what we mis-term excitement. The whole neural 
sign we term brain-sign, and  it replaces the notion of consciousness for the neural 
phenomenon. 
This is a novel concept, so recapitu lation may help. In the case of bees, communication is 
straightforward , in that the sign conveyed  in the world  by the movements of the signing bee 
can be absorbed  by the neurophysiology of the receiving bee because signs, in their 
variations, are circumscribed  and  repeatable, and  the ensuing task wholly carried  out by the 
ind ividual. For hunting lions, a d ifferent scenario exists. There is no constant repetition of a 
limited  range of sign features then acted  upon by each ind iv idual: in the hunt there is 
continual cooperative novelty that each hunting lion‟s brain must absorb and  act upon. 
Although the neurophysiology of each lion is capable of d irecting the lion‟s actions in 
relation to this novelty (and  is vastly computationally complex), the missing feature is the 
communicative feature (of limited  complexity without computation content) for the supra -
organismic hunt program. This communicative feature that holds the lions together as the 
hunt is the signifying neural sign in each lion of what the causal neurophysiology is reacting 
to. Thus causally, lion A‟s neurophysiology reacts to the hunt environment; but it signifies 
this environment by the sign of it that it manufactures: the brain -sign. If you  like, this sign is 
the elemental reason for the lion‟s actions (in the supra -organismic program). Reason, here, is 
specifically a signification of cause. But it is not cause. Bees need  no such reasons, for there is 
nothing to be explained  between them: their task is a rigid  enactmen t of a specific way of 
behaving in their functional social structure, complex though it is.  
Obviously, in the case of lions, the neural signification of the environment of the hunt 
program is a mutual reference. But it is not a reference to a mental subject. It is a reference that 
acts biologically between ind ividual organisms facilitating cooperative action on a supra -
organismic causal program to which, as the sign, it (the reference) has no access. A sign, a 
reason, a reference…and an agreement, since the zebra is the target of all the lions‟ 
neurophysiologies. Thus we see that dualism is removed , for the sign of causality as reason, 
reference and  agreement, is a wholly physical function. Signs, unlike the Greek/ Christian 
consciousness, or Dennett‟s causal intentional consciousness, are reducible (we will return to 
this). 
There is no question: If the causal neurophysiology can manage the hunt program, why is 
there signification? because causality and  signification are how dynamic cooperation takes 
place. Without signification, the hunt could  not function. Indeed , we now have a genuine 
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biogenesis for the phenomenon.
14
 We d o not separate mentality and  action; brain-sign arises 
specifically to signify in the action process. Action (potential or actual) also effe cts memory or 
imagination, the conveying of the action -related  past or possible. Causality and  signification 
are d istinct mechanisms: the ramifications of this will become evident. 
It might occur to the reader that the notion of brain -sign is bizarre because no lion can 
look inside another lion‟s brain to see the sign. But this results from retaining the (dualist) 
notion of consciousness whilst trying to understand  brain -sign theory. In the physical world , 
there is no perception. Brain-sign occurs for the supra-organismic program taking p lace 
across brains. It is a feature of that program, not some other way of specifying what happens 
concerning persons, because for a super-organism, there are no persons (or lion persons). To 
grasp brain-sign theory necessitates the giving up all associations with what consciousness is 
deemed to give. This requires practice. Indeed , to see that brain -sign is not epiphenomenal is 
a step in the grasp of the biology.  
 
 
3.2.4. Language 
 
Language is regarded  as the d istinctive feature of humans, d istingu ishing them from other 
species (though e.g. whales and  dolphins remain enigmas on this, Rendell & Whitehead , 
2001). Because language allows humans to d isengage from the rigid ity of the action -
connection with the things of the world , it is supposed  humans can consider those things 
symbolically and  analytically. Moreover, since humans share language, propositional and  
expressive communication about states of the world  and  ourselves can be d isengaged  from 
those states. Language is the last fund amental d ifference between ourselves and  other 
animals to which our self-regard  clings. 
Brain-sign theory d isagrees. It claims the physical function of language has been 
misunderstood , for no account of biology is engaged . Chomsky, for example, uses the 
expression „mind/ brain‟, thus ind icating, since mind  and  brain are not explicitly determined  
(and  deliberately so), that no biological theory underpins his language theory. (He is 
skeptical, though, that language depends upon engaging consciousness.)
15
 
As with perception for hunting lions, we must specify how language is in the physical 
world . It seems to be that which we hear, and  that which we read . But these are brain -sign 
functions, manufactured  by the brain as casual signification. Surely languag e does 
communicative work, but not causal work for the organism. What, then, goes on with 
language? 
In the physical world , language is structured  marks on e.g. paper or a computer screen. 
The brain absorbs these marks by structured  states of transduced  electromagnetic rad iation. 
In taking in these marks, the brain is not engaging with semantics. Such a supposition would  
have to explain how the neural brain could absorb structured  marks as meaning and  then 
employ it causally. There is no meaning in electromagnetic rad iation or neural structure. Yet 
it seems, by the time we see language on the paper, we recognize it, that which has 
familiarity. Here, for example, is Fod or (1987) in Psychosemantics: “To understand  a sentence 
is to grasp the thought that its utterance stand ard ly conveys” (p151). But Fodor d oes not tell 
us what understand entails, nor grasp nor thought. No theory cogently specifies these as 
biology. So, as with perception, we reject the notion that a person‟s mind  contains (in its inner 
                                                 
14The late Jeffrey Gray, in his 2004 book, states that there is no evidence to account for either the phylogeny or ontogeny of 
consciousness (pp117-120). Indeed, he stated (personal communication, 2002) that “no one understands why the brain needed to 
invent visual consciousness, since it can do so much processing of visual stimuli unconsciously.” It is interesting, therefore, that 
he continued to support such a feature of the universe. 
 
15Discussion on this topic by William Lycan (2003) can be found in his „Chomsky on the Mind-Body Problem‟, with Chomsky‟s 
reply in the same volume.  
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state) language to which they are orientated  by (causal) recognitional understanding.
16
 The 
brain manufactures the state of „seeing‟ the language and  the sense of familiarity because it 
has so ad apted  by past exposure, and that is its physical function. (Similarly when we hear 
language from structured  compression waves.) But why is that its function? 
Our d iscussion of perception offers a ready answer. We „see‟ or „hear‟ language because 
that is neural signification in the communication process with others. We d o not do anything 
because of what we see or hear, because our actions, or potential actions, are caused  by the 
physical activity of our brains from absorbing the electromagnetic rad iation or  compression 
waves input. Learning to use language is learning communicat ive behavior in the physical 
world  per se. Communicative behavior resu lts from neural modification. In other words, there 
is no causal problem arising from semantics because semantics is irrelevant  as is syntax. 
Semantics and  syntax are the making sense as brain-sign, i.e. as our state „takes itself to be‟ as a 
communicative mechanism.  
Now we see the issue at 2.1 with interpreting fMRI scanning. In Neville et al.‟s example  
(1998), what is likely illuminated  in the Broca and  Wernicke areas for both hearing readers of 
language and  deaf ASL readers of signs is causal processing of language. The activation of 
the superior temporal gyrus in deaf readers is also causal processing, as is the case with 
hearers of spoken language. Brain -sign as communication, however, is a d ifferent function. 
Of course this does not solve brain -sign location, or its means of integration. 
In being the brain-sign product „seeing‟ or „hearing‟, we have no access to the causes of 
our actions or potential actions. The brain could  not overcome this d ivision by its mechanism 
of self-interpretation from causal states to brain -sign. Verbal interpretation (as brain -sign) is 
bounded  by the physical mechanisms of the brain itself which are not knowledge.
17
 We 
misinterpret this adap tation fund amentally if we suppose (e.g.) expressed  beliefs constitute 
causality. The brain believes nothing. 
For example: A reader of this paper is trad itionally supposed  to be attempting to 
understand  its content, and  then perhaps make a decision on whether they agree w ith (we 
might say believe) it. But how could  a neural brain weigh evidence and  make a judgment as to 
rightness or wrongness (or truth or falsity)? A neural brain processes structured  physical 
information, orientating itself towards action. Thus the read ing  of the paper is the process of 
colonization of the reader‟s neural structure and  operation by the writer‟s brain. As brain -
sign, the reader „sees‟ and  „understands‟ the words/ concepts. Because they are this brain -sign 
of „seeing‟ and  „understand ing‟, both the reader‟s and  writer‟s brains can be in a state of 
signifying similarity concerning the potential action they might perform. Thus they (i.e. 
brain-signs) can be physical neural communication. 
Still, what may be d ifferent is that the writer, as brain -sign, has the sense of rightness of the 
content, whereas the reader may have a sense of confusion or d isagreement. So action likely 
would  not coincide. But confusion and  d isagreement are no more accurate in terms of 
correspondence to an underlying reality th an is the sense of rightness. The brain is a 
proactive/ reactive physical organ, not a container of the right and  the wrong, not a parallel 
reality of the Greek/ Christian trad ition. 
The writer cannot persuade the reader of rightness. Persuasion entails mentalism. The 
writer‟s brain (biologically) colonizes the reader‟s brain in the physical process of read ing: it 
is for brain science to ascertain the neural mechanism whereby the reader‟s actions might or 
might not result in positive influence from neural mod ification.
18
 It is also for brain science to 
                                                 
16 Recall Heidegger (1927) in Being and Time: “Of course we are sometimes assured that we are certainly not to think of the 
„subject‟s inside‟ and it‟s „inner sphere‟ as a sort of „box‟ or „cabinet‟. But when one asks for the positive signification of this 
„inside‟ of immanence in which knowing [or understanding] is proximally enclosed…then silence reigns” (p87). 
 
17In principle, this accords with Gazzaniga‟s (e.g. 2005) finding of the left brain interpreter in split-brain subjects. However 
Gazzaniga remains within the Greek/Christian traditionfor the anomalies of visual states, as with the left hemisphere‟s verbal 
fabrication, by not acknowledging that conscious interpretation cannot be causal for the organism.See Chapter 9: The Believing 
Brain, and note 5 for historical references. 
18This is not meme theory, the invention of Richard Dawkins (1976), which assumes mentalism. 
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determine the means by which a related  brain -sign occurs. It is not for brain science to 
determine how brains interpret semantics. 
One further observation. In read ing or listening to language, as brain -sign we are not only 
what we „see‟ and  „hear‟ lingu istically. Also present are „images‟, „senses‟, „feelings‟ of 
varying intensity. But how could  hearing the word  (e.g.) mountain evoke the associated  
images and  senses? Mentalism would  have it that one mental state causes another, the heard  
word  mountain causes the image (but why this one?). There is no scientific explanation for 
this. Brain-sign theory proposes a d ifferent account. Structured  electromagnetic rad iation or 
compression waves, as physically transduced  st imuli, activate neural structures generating 
the „seen‟ or „heard‟ word  mountain, but also other facets like „images‟ and  „sensations‟ 
because of causally associated  neural architecture. What evidence d o we draw for this? The 
experiments of Wilder Penfield  (1958), where electrical stimulation of areas of the cortex (i.e. 
physical stimulation) generated  comprehensive images, speech, sensations, apparently as 
quasi-memories. 
 
 
4. THE NATURE OF BRAIN-SIGN  
 
Although only a few characteristics of brain -sign have been mentioned , particu larly 
perception and  language, we can draw some helpful d istinctions between it and  
consciousness.  
 
 
4.1 Brain-sign vs. consciousness 
 
The theory of consciousness must not only exp lain what mental entities  are, it must explain 
mental processing. But how would  the brain process in a modality d ifferent from what it is: 
physical causality? New theories appear regularly (e.g. Damasio 2000).
19
 But no explanation 
will reconcile the terms because the attempt to make the mind  physical start s with a 
prescientific model devised  for a d ifferent ontological rationale from the universe of 
physicality.
20,21
 
Brain-sign theory bypasses this because its origins are in  the material of which we are 
made. Two separate but linked  mechanisms exist in the br ain: one, the causal properties 
determining what the organism d oes; the other, a signifying status for communication 
between separate neurophysiologies derived  from the causal mechanism.  
Crucially, since each organism‟s history will result in a d ifferent neural/ causal relation to 
the world , consciousness = knowledge (that which is to a subject, 2.3) cannot exist, since 
brain-sign is an interpretation of each brain‟s d ifferent adapted  causal relation to the world . 
For communication, however, brain-sign serves. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19Antonio Damasio‟s (2000) is a variation on higher order theory, but lacks explanation of how physicality becomes mentality. 
He says: “Many of us in neuroscience are guided by one goal and one hope: to provide, eventually, a comprehensive explanation 
for how the sort of neural pattern that we can currently describe with the tools of neurobiology, from molecules to systems, can 
ever become the multidimensional, space-and-time integrated image we are experiencing this very moment” (p322). In other 
words, he has no theory. His commitment to the Greek/Christian tradition is seen in the following: “The drama of the human 
condition thus comes from consciousness because it concerns knowledge obtained in a bargain that none of us struck: the cost of 
a better existence is the loss of innocence about that very existence” (p316). There is no characterisation here in terms of the 
physical world, nor is knowledge given any scientific definition. 
20As Kim (2005) ranges over theories of reducibility proposed recently, “the new materialism”, there is no mention, by the 
proposers, that both the function and nature of the mental are undefined as physicality. In other words, the predicament of us as 
experiencers-appearers (cf. 2.2.2) as biology is unnoticed. Dennett has taken the correct position in not accepting that 
consciousness can be ascertained entirely from within. The problem is, he does not disengage from the tradition adequately (cf. 
note 4). 
21 Cf. Peschl (1999): “It is not the goal of the neural representation system to map the environment as accurately as possible [i.e. 
perceptual knowledge] but to generate functionally fitting behavior” (p187). 
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4.2. Brain-sign as physical state 
 
Psychology, as a d iscipline, is founded  upon many functions: perception, thought, feeling, 
etc., and  innumerable others: hope, expectation, fear, indulgence, forgiveness, terror, and  so 
on. The brain supposed ly manufactures this vast complex so it can be causal as them. 
If we banish psychology we eliminate these separate functions, and  grant one causal kind  
of thing, the physical brain. This does not mean the brain itself is not structured  in d ifferent 
functions; brain imaging ind icates that they are located  in specific areas (cf. 2.1), though how 
this operates is still in debate (cf. 3.1). 
The derivative brain phenomenon, however, is of one kind . There are no psychological 
types as ind ividual causal functions, but there are d ifferent signifying types of one kind : 
brain-sign.  
Consciousness theory proposes we know the content our own states. They self-reveal how 
we approach the world , and  what causes our actions in it. Brain -sign recasts the brain 
phenomenon functionally. For example, the brain d oes not engage a tree neutrally as a mere 
seeing of it, even though we (as brain -sign) may suppose we are gazing at it ind ifferently. 
This is because the brain is always action -orientated . Even if we do not seem emotionally or 
critically or attentionally orientated  toward  the tree, we cannot judge this from the 
phenomenon we are, for two reasons. Firstly, since the function of the phenomenon is 
communication with other brains, we cannot assess the neural nature of our state, i.e. its 
physical relation to the world  actually. This is true specifically of attention (often a feature of 
„psychological‟ testing). We do not choose to pay attention: our d irectedness is already a state 
of neural orientation, which a tester‟s brain may hav e caused  us, as test-subjects, to be in. If 
we find  we are paying attention, this is already a new orientation and  entails loss of 
attention. Secondly, we can never judge of our own states, for there is no (mental) we to d o so 
– no reflective capability. 
If, for example, we „reflect‟ that we find  this tree attractive, are we jud ging of the tree or of 
our own state? Neither. The brain, creating brain -sign, signifies its causal status. Firstly, we 
„see‟ the tree as beautiful because we are held before it as a result of its configuration and  
properties. In (expressibly) „reflecting‟ that the tree is beautifu l, our brains communicate  their 
causal neural orientation. An animal, by contrast, may be held before a tree, but since it 
cannot externalize its state―it has no language causally to influence another animal―its 
brain-sign mod ality will not be expressible as „language‟ that cou ld  alter another‟s causal 
state. Thus we see how so-called  reflection can be explained  for us (as neural expression), and  
why it cannot exist for most animals. But it is not reflection (a mental property). 
Language is not some new magic feature of humans; it is an evolved  extension of alread y 
existing mechanisms.
22
 
Mentalism has been preoccupied  with a life-long I, the subject of mental subjectivity, and  
the being of the person. But there are two counters to this, the first from brain -sign theory 
itself. Since brain-sign exists at this moment, and  is derived  from the causal status of the 
brain, and  this w ill never be identically repeated , it is impossible for there to be an enduring 
I. The I is an expression of the moment, and  is welded  to immediate content. The second  is 
that since brain-sign performs no ep istemological function for the brain (cf. 2.2.2), there is no 
way of founding the possibility that the I now was the I of the past or that of the future. The 
sense of the „I‟ is a biological marker of this organism in communication now, not the 
Cartesian I of the soul, or the Kantian logical I by which experience can be consistently ours.
23
 
This sense of the „I‟, as of the conviction of right and  wrong, or Wegner‟s feeling of will, is a 
construct of the brain for communication. Thus egoism, as a method ological -ontological 
principle for mental states, is d isbarred . No I exists to experience, nor to whom appearances 
appear. 
 
                                                 
22Thus in the case of intentionalist and emergentist philosophers like John Searle (e.g. 2002), we eliminate the nature of what 
they propose exists (consciousness), and the need to fabricate a non-physical-world account of physicality. 
23 Kant was well aware that the continued existence of the I could not be proved, Third Paralogism: Of Personality. 
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4.3. Brain-sign as neural self-interpretation 
 
Mentalism proposes that physical input to the brain is turned  into a d ifferent kind  of existent 
and  then processed  as such by the brain. For action, this has to be turned  back into 
physicality to cause motor results. The justification is that we appear to be this d ifferent 
existent. We have raised  fundamental objections to that position.
24
 
When we use the expression “neural self-interpretation” as brain -sign we mean the 
following. Action, for example in seeing a tree thence going up to touch it, results from the 
brain „accessing‟ the tree as physical sensory and  neural processing. This, then, translates into 
motor actions of the requisite type. To effect action, the brain uses edge detection, feature 
detection, motion detection, rad iation wave-length detection, all of which are causal as 
physical states. Brain science should  determine how the brain is so operative. Nonetheless the 
brain does have the capacity to make from them a neural image for communication purposes 
because the structure is „p resupposed‟ or „prefabricated‟, as an assembly, in the action. To 
that image is added  other features, as we have d iscussed , forming the whole of brain -sign at 
this moment. The inevitable delay between the brain‟s causal activity and  what was taken to 
be our experience, the delay identified  by Libet et al. (1983), is explained  by the separate 
functions of causality and  signification. 
A crucial criterion valid ating the brain -sign account over mentalism is error, or 
misrepresentation. The image „we see‟ is not a replication of what is there. It is an 
interpretation by the brain of what it takes to be there in terms of its causal relation to it, 
founded  upon a history of adap tation. Thus error ca n enter the process because what we see 
is representation  via causality. Thus we can see dog for cat, street light for tree, because the 
image d oes not covary with the world  to mental processing, but communicates how the 
organism may or will causally react to what it takes to be there from its established  states.
25
 
The comparison we make for brain-sign, as a sign, is with the chameleon‟s skin. The 
chameleon‟s brain can make of its skin, a cellular structure, patterns and  reflectance that 
work as a survival m echanism because a pred ator‟s brain cannot d istingu ish the chameleon 
from its surroundings.
26
 No requirement exists for ontological replication between the skin 
configuration and  the surroundings. Similarly, brains communicate by making, of neural 
structures in the brain, brain-signs; states w ith no required  ontological replication of the 
world . Thus, while mentality has no evolutionary precursor, brain -sign has. Signification is 
widespread  in biology. 
It is obvious, however, that brain -sign is hugely wasteful, since most communication is 
not established  between organisms. But this derives from the fact that most of the brain‟s 
action orientation is not activated  actually, in e.g. „memory‟ and  „imagination‟. However, the 
brain cannot switch itself off when it  cannot communicate (cf. Wegner 2002, p28).  
Although we cannot support Sartre‟s (1943) view of consciousness, of his many 
penetrating notions, that of the futile aim of the pour-soi (read  consciousness) to be an en-soi 
(read  the physical world) is remarkably apposite. Modern philosophy, in looking for mind -
brain red uction, expounds this futility. For we are not causally in the world  as brain-sign; we 
are a sign of a state that is causally in the world , and  to which, per se, we have no operative 
access. 
 
 
                                                 
24 There have been attempts to circumvent this problem, notably that of O‟Regan and Noë (2001). But this is stymied at its 
origin, since in proposing that “visual perception…[is] the activity of exploring the environment…mediated by knowledge of 
the…sensory-motor contingencies” (p943), they simply substitute one inexplicable knowledge, actual perception, by another, “of 
the sensory-motor contingencies”. Also Noë (2005). 
25 The problem for covariationists is discussed by Cummins (1989). He says (p69): “Idealization is the only way to go with the 
idea that representation is covariation, for the covariationist, in the face of misrepresentation, must say, in effect, „Well there 
would be covariation if things were nice.‟” But idealization is not an option.  
26 Another explanation for the chameleon‟s skin patterning is to convey its „emotional‟ state. For our purposes, the explanation is 
not crucial. 
  
 
 
Activitas Nervosa Superior 2011, 53, No. 3-4 
 
 
118 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
What needs to be said  on this topic has been minimally touched  upon. However, these must 
be the last remarks. 
As brain-sign, we seem to write what we think, reach for what we see, and  comment on 
how we feel. However, „thinking‟, „seeing‟ and  „feeling‟ have no causal impact on writing, 
reaching and  commenting. Indeed , it is because of their separation, and  the misinterpreted  
evidence concerning this, that the theory of consciousness had  to develop an unconscious, or 
non-conscious, to sustain itself. But that only made the problem of consciousness more 
obscure. For although we seem to write what we think, or reach for what we see, there is an 
unbridgeable gulf between e.g. our seeing and  reaching, since they are caused  by different 
mechanisms, and  can result in a complete lack of correspondence between them. This is 
apparent in the Titchener circles illusion (Milner  & Goodale, 1995), where motor actions 
appear d ivorced  from visual representation. 
Indeed , science cannot depend  upon mental states with their inner knowledge capacity, as 
trad itionally supposed  (cf. Giere 2000, p . 523). Science and  technology are adaptive biological 
activities of the neural brain  as neurophysiology (cf. Peschl, 1999).But science could  not 
operate without the ability of inter-organism/ brain communication, which is brain sign. 
Thus brain-sign, and  the new neurophysiological mapping language for action, are not 
new names for familiar functions. Entirely new descriptive methods will be involved  for  
each, reconstructing fundamentally our view of ourselves, and  other organisms. The new 
neurophysiological mapping language allows description in terms of physicality, i.e. an 
escape from the futile attempt to locate psychology in the brain.  
Brain-sign and  consciousness offer d ifferent accounts of the brain phenomenon we are. 
How will we jud ge which is correct? As with all topics in science, the answer is: by 
experiment―though this will be bounded  by the function of brain -sign itself. What is 
certainly the case, as this text ind icates, is that brain-sign is the only comprehensive account 
that meets the current evidence. Moreover, it is the only account that begins from the 
physical world , and  offers a scientific analysis of how the phenomenon could  have evolved  
and  function in the brain, with a reducible ontology and  necessary biological role.  
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